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P rior to the economic reforms of the 1980s, New Zealand followed a Keynesian interventionism model that fostered government responsibility to look after its citizens.1 The government took 
responsibility for affecting employment and unemployment rates and 
acknowledged when and where there were housing needs before being 
charged to take action to do something to address them. Deregulation 
in the 1980s meant the government was able to contract out services for 
which they had earlier taken responsibility, giving Māori opportunities 
to develop culturally centred service provision. An overview of the 
challenges afforded by these opportunities is presented throughout 
this chapter.
In 1986, the World Health Organization (WHO) published the 
Ottawa Charter.2 With the New Zealand government’s adoption of the 
Charter, a reorientation of health services towards public health took 
shape. This new approach was radically different from the sickness and 
individually focused treatment services that previously dominated. 
The shift in health service orientation and the introduction of other 
neoliberal reforms created an opportunity for Māori to take more 
control of their own health outcomes through the delivery of culturally 
relevant and appropriate services.3 
Both the Ministry of Health (then the Department of Health)4 and the 
Ministry of Māori Development (Te Puni Kōkiri)5 provided advice as to 
how well, or not, the new process fitted with the elected government’s 
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directive towards Māori health policy. Among Māori communities, this 
opportunity was grasped eagerly as a means of taking control of health 
delivery to their members; the changes were seen as the answer to 
calls for more autonomy when it came to improving outcomes in Māori 
health, education, justice and employment.6
Jump forward to 2017, and the shift to neoliberal economics and 
the virtual hegemony enjoyed among economic commentators, 
policymakers and business leaders has left no room for the ‘social 
welfare’ system of earlier times.7 The National Government’s neo-
liberal economic reforms of the 1990s carried forward the ‘New 
Right’ ideology by: 1, the continued corporatisation and privatisation 
of many government enterprises; 2, stripping back and restructuring 
the welfare state; 3, increasing user charges for health and education; 
and 4, devolving responsibility for the provision of health and social 
services to Māori communities. 
This chapter focuses on the last point, and explains how the pressure 
to produce improved health, without the commitment of sufficient and 
continued resources, places Māori providers, and whānau by virtue of a 
flow-on effect, in a position of precariousness. Rather than describe in 
detail the level of inequity that abounds within health-service funding 
and provision, I attempt to take a humorous approach, by touching 
on the issues and making connection to a game of Slides and Ladders 
(renamed from Snakes and Ladders, as snakes don’t fit with the health 
theme of the chapter). At the end of each paragraph below I have 
inserted a comment, for example [Go forward] or [Slide backwards]. 
These little asides serve as a reminder about the Slides and Ladders 
game. 
Health service provision for Māāori
While the devolution of state responsibility had a huge economic 
impact on Māori, it also allowed for local indigenous control over 
the design and delivery of community-based and culturally sensitive 
services.8 There was a great desire to fill an unmet need and access 
funding that would enable the provision of appropriate services to 
Māori. Aotearoa New Zealand’s commitment to the World Health 
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Organization’s agenda of ensuring that everyone had access to an 
acceptable level of health services on fair terms gave New Zealanders 
the freedom to choose where to go for services that suited their 
individual and collective needs. This came alongside the opportunity 
for Māori service provision, which meant that ‘by Māori/for Māori’ 
programmes and services seemingly appeared overnight. [Start game] 
The New Zealand health system went through a series of changes 
during the 1990s, but has always retained a significant public provision 
of health services.9 Among the changes that took place was a split 
of the purchasing role from a providing role, which was premised 
on the perceived efficiencies that would eventuate from introduced 
competition10 — the idea that the inherent superiority of the market 
would deliver better health outcomes by forcing providers to become 
more accountable to both purchasers and their patients. [Go forward]
Successive governments during the 1990s pushed for ‘local 
solutions to local problems’. This suited the ‘new’ initiatives, such as 
Māori providers,11 because it allowed them greater autonomy from 
government and increased their sense of control over their own 
destinies. ‘Autonomy’ was perceived as economic control — with a 
growth in economic control came a sense of autonomy. Goodwill grew 
between Māori and the government during this period.12 [Go forward]
While the promise of autonomy was held out to Māori in one hand, 
the other hand held funding constraints and inequitable contracts 
between Regional Health Authorities (purchasers of health services — 
also known as the ‘Funder’) and Māori providers around the country, 
which hampered the promised health autonomy. [Slide backwards]
The ability to use Māori cultural constructs in the development and 
delivery of health programmes was seen as an acknowledgement of the 
government’s willingness to recognise the place of Māori in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. Through development of a suitably acceptable proposal 
for service provision, Māori providers (and communities) believed that 
the government would give them access to the previously untapped 
Bank of Continued Funding, which had been continually available to 
mainstream service providers. [Go forward — climb the ladder]
Since the establishment of the first hospitals in the 1880s, and the 
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introduction of the Public Health Act in 1872, the provision of health 
services has been seen as paramount in this country.13 New Zealand 
citizens have had continual access to mainstream health and social 
services that have been funded to reduce negative health impacts. 
However, government reports over the decades (both before and since 
the health reforms) clearly show that negative health impacts have 
increased, rather than decreased, for Māori in mainstream health 
services. Yet the provision of funding has continued, if not increased. 
[Lose a turn]
Māori providers (and service users) believed that while they might 
make a few mistakes in the delivery of culturally centred services to 
their communities, they would be afforded the opportunity to learn 
from these mistakes and amend their service delivery appropriately 
until the desired health changes were achieved. Such had been their 
observations of mainstream service providers. [Go forward]
However, before Māori realised what had happened, their Māori 
service providers had entered a game of Slides and Ladders that 
involved a requirement to walk down the ‘yellow brick road’ made 
of eggs. The pathways in the service provider system required Māori 
providers to learn the skill of walking on eggs. As with any new skill, 
Māori providers being new to the game had to learn the art quickly, 
without any resources or tools to help them, and with the constant 
sound of a ticking clock reminding them that there was only so much 
time left before they lost their funding. [Slide backwards]
As with all health services, the provision, activities, outputs and 
outcomes of the provider’s work must be reported to the Funder. All 
expenditure must be financially accounted for and tangible health 
gains must be achieved with every step (these translate as a measurable 
reduction in a negative health occurrence — such as fewer people 
dying of lung cancer as a result of smoking). Each of these demands on 
service providers can be equated to the ‘eggs’ that must be walked over 
in order to access the fabled Bank of Continued Funding. The ability 
to travel along this roadway without cracking (any) eggshells involves 
having absolutely robust mechanisms that meet the cultural norms of 
a health system set up to serve the dominant beliefs and values that 
fiscal worth equates to tangible benefits that can be physically counted 
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and seen. [You must roll 4 to move]
Let’s face it, Māori are aware that the (health funding) system is not 
fair because the system was not set up to serve Māori needs in the first 
instance. (If Māori controlled the distribution of health resources to 
everyone in the country, would the health system look the same as it 
does now? What would it look like?) What has become more evident 
as government election cycles continue, with their promises of better 
healthcare services while at the same time injecting less money than 
needed into the sector — particularly less than needed in some parts of 
the system where Māori needs are greatest — is the unequal treatment 
of service providers.14 Despite an increase in government spend on 
health services, inequity is demonstrable when resources are given to 
mainstream providers (such as District Health Boards — DHBs) who 
continue to control regional service delivery that does not meet the 
needs of Māori communities in their regions. 
DHBs are more likely to access continued funding despite some 
major failures to achieve large health gains for Māori. Māori providers 
are more likely to be severely penalised (by being denied access to 
further funding) if they fail to meet one of the numerous demands 
to eliminate poor Māori health within their time and resource-
constrained contracts. I liken the privilege afforded to DHBs in this 
instance (and other mainstream government-funded providers) to 
being given support by way of ‘hover shoes’. Such support enables 
mainstream services to easily travel the pathway of continued funding 
without ever breaking any eggs along the way.
Government agencies (as funders, providers and auditors) are 
the tools of a system that was created by a privileged group with a 
specific set of values that reflect what is desired for those who look, 
think, believe and act like them.15 Because the system was created by 
those in power to serve those in power, government agencies have a 
smooth road when it comes to accessing funding. The health system 
was not created by or for the Māori providers trying to access that same 
funding; nor does the health system have the same values and priorities 
that Māori do. As a result, even though the intended outcomes may be 
the same (that we live longer and in better health) what that picture of 
health looks like and the ways of measuring the successful provision of 
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Example of a funder 
requirement
Impact of failure to 
deliver for Māori 
service providers (likely 
discontinued funding)
Impact of failure to 
deliver for mainstream 
service providers




Unexpected loss of key 
staff means a new person 
must be hired to provide 
such information. 
Unexpected loss of 
key staff means a new 
person must be hired to 
provide such information. 
Expectation that such 
information will be 
provided in the next cycle.
Report deadlines 




resources need to be 
redirected from delivery. 
Negotiation for a ‘grace 
period’ not approved.
Infrastructure in place 
to manage this but more 
time needed. Negotiate a 
‘period of grace’ whereby 
the information will be 
provided in the next cycle.
Demonstration of 
fiscal accountability. 
Transfer of funds to meet 
other identified areas 
of need is insufficient. 
Without additional 
resources further detail 
cannot be produced. 
Transfer of funds to meet 
other identified areas of 
need is accepted. Further 
details can be produced 
on request, with additional 
resources.
A new requirement 
for an evaluation of 
services provided.
New skilled staff must be 
contracted to complete 
this task; more time 
required.
Other programmes of 
a similar nature were 






meant this was not 
achieved. Will keep trying.
Community circumstances 
meant this was not 
achieved. Will keep trying.
services for Māori within the health system are less valued.
For Māori providers (and whānau), navigating the health system is 
like an uneven race. Some are given a clear pathway with no obstacles, 
and with helpful supports along the way, which enable them to access 
continued funding (as a provider) or (as individuals) have a long and 
healthy life with minimal disruptions to their everyday life. [Slide 
backwards]
The uneven and unequal pathways by which Māori and mainstream 
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providers access resources have been demonstrated by a range of 
researchers and reports. 16
Māori providers can often be left feeling squeezed between ‘a rock 
and a hard place’ when it comes to meeting the demands of government 
funders and Māori communities whose demands for a culturally 
appropriate health service prioritise spiritual and cultural health over 
the absence of physical disease. 
In such scenarios Māori providers can expend resources over and 
above what they have been funded to deliver in order to support 
whānau in ways that are more culturally familiar to them. Sadly, such 
additional activities are either not counted or are given less importance 
within the current reporting structures. Juggling the demands of both 
the funders and the service users is a difficult space for Māori providers 
to navigate; with the constant threat of losing their service contracts, 
Māori providers are in an under-recognised precarious position. [Go 
back to the start]
Closing comments
New Zealand’s history is full of examples of well-meaning policies 
with the best intentions failing to achieve positive gains for those most 
in need. Long gone are the days of positive social welfare reforms. 
Instead, the New Zealand government has regularly been below the 
OECD average when it comes to social spending as a percentage of GDP. 
Money that could buffer low-income families and support them in ways 
that would enable them to be well is much harder to access. The health 
system is an example; the majority of its most vulnerable and in need 
of government resources are Māori. Māori (and other NGO) providers 
are trying hard to meet contracts that are administratively demanding 
and difficult to interpret, and which threaten their ability to provide 
culturally and socially relevant services.
Although New Zealanders have seen the closure of small (rural) 
hospitals and some major commercial providers have lost their 
contracts (for example, laboratory services), the history of government 
bail-outs for DHBs does not allow them to fail. The same is not true 
for Māori providers. Despite increasing demand and decreasing 
funding, Māori providers and whānau (service users, family members 
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and extended family) find creative and meaningful ways to continue. 
The continued existence of Māori providers suggests that some have 
‘cracked the code’ and are able to keep playing the game of Slides and 
Ladders. I hope that my analogy, likened to a child’s game, has helped 
to prevent people from getting bogged down in the negativity of the 
whole situation. 
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